A heuristic approach to interdisciplinary theory development : nurturing a renaissance in strategic management by Carroll, Charles et al.

UNIVERSITY OF
ILLINOIS LIBRARY
AT URBANA-CHAMPAJGN
BOOKSTACKS
Digitized by the Internet Archive
in 2012 with funding from
University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign
http://www.archive.org/details/heuristicapproac93100carr

B385
1993:100 COPY 2
Faculty working Faper 93-0100 &&' i bi
s»
***>
<?******
A Heuristic Approach to Interdisciplinary Theory
Development: Nurturing A Renaissance in
Strategic Management
Charles Carroll Joseph Porac
Graduate Student Professor of Business Administration
University of Illinois University of Illinois
Howard Tljomas
Dean andfames F. Towey
Professor of Strategic Management
College of Commerce and Business Administration
University of Illinois
Bureau of Economic and Business Research
College of Commerce and Business Administration
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign

BEBR
FACULTY WORKING PAPER MO. 93-0100
College of Commerce and Business Administration
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
January 1993
A Heuristic Approach to Interdisciplinary Theory
Development: Nurturing A Renaissance in
Strategic Management
Charles Carroll
Joseph Porac
Howard Thomas

Abstract
Empirical studies on collectives of firms (cognitive communities, cooperative and competitive
networks, strategic groups) reveal that different theoretical perspectives converge in stable
industries (Scottish knitwear, UK grocery retailing) but diverge in ambiguous, turbulent industries
(US computer software). Ironically, the ambiguity that may create a demand for theories may also
create the conditions under which the theoretical perspectives (e.g., psychology, organizational
behavior, economics) provide the most divergent sets of results. Consequently, general managers
may be hard pressed to develop a comprehensive strategy based on reports submitted from a
variety of departments by analysts trained in different areas. With this in mind, a theoretical
framework is proposed as part of a stream of interdisciplinary research. Analytic models
developed within this synthesis process may improve techniques for forecasting industry
dynamics, especially in oligopolies and highly turbulent environments. This may help practitioners
cope with the kinds of rapid changes that are coursing through the business world today.

A Heuristic Approach to Interdisciplinary Theory Development:
Nurturing A Renaissance in Strategic Management
Today's managers are faced with a world that is rapidly changing. Many firms are
undergoing structural metamorphoses to better fit the demands of post- industrial environments.
Structural changes are simultaneously occurring at more macro levels. Throughout Europe, many
long-standing political and economic boundaries are rapidly changing. Events such as these demand
a rebirth and revitalization of managerial thought.
As the business world undergoes a renaissance, the academic world may be forced to
undergo a renaissance of its own. Researchers may draw on a number of paradigms to study
strategic management in these turbulent times. For example, psychology may provide insights into
the rational and emotional aspects of decision-making for individuals faced with ambiguity and
change. Organizational behavior may cast some light on interactions among individuals within and
between firms as modes of organizing shift. Industrial-organization (I-O) economics may generate
implications for interactions among firms as the structure of industries change.
Each perspective may capture a part of a given strategic management phenomena, but like
the parable of three blind men feeling an elephant, an integrated understanding is rarely obtained.
To understand the implications of such dramatic changes occurring at so many different levels,
researchers may find it necessary to tear down some of their own boundaries or run the risk of
overlooking some of the critical forces for change.
To date, there has been little progress in synthesizing the diverse theories used in strategic
management research into one coherent theoretical perspective. The primary difficulties stem from
incompatible assumptions, differences in units of analysis, etc. There have been calls for a
multilectic approach in which (partially) incommensurate theoretical perspectives are juxtaposed.
However, it may not be sufficient to suggest that different perspectives provide different insights
without integrating those findings. Huff ( 1981, p. 87) argues that "the culture clash between
genuinely different points of view can be an important basis for the development of knowledge."
Such theory-driven clashes can stimulate creative thinking. This may lead to the extension of
existing theories or the development new ones.
However, the integration of the accumulated knowledge need not be theory-driven.
Expanding on the parable of the three blind men feeling an elephant, the men may be unable to
integrate their findings if they (a) separately develop theories based on unique subsets of data, and
then (b) share their theories. An alternative would be to (a) systematically combine their raw data,
and then (b) develop theories based more complete information.
In empirical sciences, theories generally represent abstractions of accumulated data. As
such, they tend to be more compact and less cumbersome to deal with than the underlying body of
data. However, a set of data may be interpreted in more than one way, and the abstraction process
in theory development may induce pronounced biases into the accumulating body of knowledge.
This suggests an efficiency-effectiveness trade-off. Relative to operating on raw data,
manipulating abstractions of the data (theories) may increase the efficiency of integration attempts
by reducing the number of elements considered. However, using those abstractions may reduce
the effectiveness of integration attempts by accepting an unknown degree of bias in each body of
knowledge. A heuristic for managing this trade-off, given that the degree of bias is unknown,
would be to focus first on the highest level of abstracted information in each field. This would
reduce the number of elements considered. If a synthesis is not be readily forthcoming at the
highest levels of abstraction (theories), successively lower levels of abstraction could be
considered. While a relatively data-driven approach may generally be less efficient, it may be more
effective than a more theory-driven approach in some cases. 1
In strategic management, a purely theory-driven synthesis of knowledge from related fields
seems implausible. In the spirit of an academic renaissance, this paper is intended to nurture a
rebirth of theory development from a marriage of empirical findings from several fields. A heuristic
^This is not to imply that data are free of bias. It is assumed that interpretation of data introduces more sources of
potential bias. It is possible that the new sources of bias may offset existing biases in the data. Alternatively, the
degree of bias may increase as independent sources of bias are added and/or interactions among biases are generated.
approach to interdisciplinary theory' development is illustrated via a discussion of different
perspectives on collectives of firms. First, collectives within industries are considered from three
theoretical perspectives. Then, empirical findings from a series of studies are systematically
examined to develop a more holistic understanding of collectives of firms within industries. This
heuristic approach is expanded to address a broader scope of issues in strategic management. A
framework is provided as a blueprint for the synthesis of the bodies of knowledge accumulated in
fields related to strategic management. Finally, ongoing streams of research are outlined.
An Example Based on Collectives of Firms
The first step in this illustrative example is to address the relatively abstract contributions
from each field. A number of theoretical constructs have been used to describe collectives of firms
within industries. Cognitive communities emphasize issues from psychology, strategic groups
reflect issues from I-O economics, and networks of interacting firms reflect issues from
organizational behavior and organizational theory. In this section, definitions of these constructs
are proposed, and the overlap of these definitions is discussed.
Cognitive Communities
Economic incentives have been used to explain a wide range of phenomena. However,
managers operate under bounded rationality. They are influenced by economic incentives, but only
indirectly through their perceptions of those incentives. If a manager does not perceive an
economic incentive, that incentive will have no influence on the manager's choices regarding either
actions inside her firm or transactions with other firms.
Managers are motivated to make accurate assessments of the opportunities and threats in the
environment as well as the strengths and weaknesses of the firm. In this sense-making process,
cognitive structures such as taxonomies of firms and causal maps are used to link strategic actions
to performance. In this way, managers are drawn toward economically rational decisions, but
imperfectly so. The situation is complicated further in that manager do not act in a vacuum. Each
manager is surrounded by others who are equally unable to flawlessly perceive "economic reality"
(although some of them would not admit it, not even to themselves).
The relative profitability of various patterns of interactions are learned (a) directly through
trial and error, (b) vicariously through observation, and (c) through instruction via word of mouth,
trade publications, industry observers, etc. Applying a population ecology view of the survival a
dispersion of ideas throughout the niche, beliefs that approximate the economic reality of the
industry will survive longer and disperse more widely than less accurate beliefs. Ultimately, the
less accurate beliefs will be forced out as the more accurate beliefs diffuse among actors and
become widely shared.2
Cognitive maps are essentially informal theories; those that best explain observed events in
an industry are retained, while those that accumulate a large number of anomalous observations
tend to be discarded (Kuhn, 1962). This process results in a socially constructed understanding of
what works in that industry. Those sharing the resulting set of beliefs constitute a cognitive
community (Porac and Thomas, 1990; Porac, Thomas, and Baden-Fuller, 1989). The consensual
set of beliefs make up the norms or recipes for doing business in that industry.
Two definitions of cognitive communities are proposed. The weak definition is based
solely on similarity of cognitive structures (e.g., taxonomies of rivals, causal map); the strong
definition additionally requires active interactions, mutual influence, and collective cognitive
efforts.
Under the strong definition, it is conceivable that the cognitive community could
collectively extend the boundaries of rationality by pooling existing information and cognitive
resources. The Japanese approach to developing a fifth generation computer illustrates the
potential power that collective action can have in solving complex problems.
Rather than directing the pooled efforts toward a particular technological challenge,
members of a cognitive community may direct their efforts toward solving specific strategic
^Escalating commitment and other psychological factors may motivate some managers to push ideas in spite of
failures (at least temporarily).
management issues and finding optimal patterns of transactions. For example, members of a
cognitive community might jointly identify a cooperative pattern of interactions that yields
satisfactory profits for all its members without a negative impact on social welfare. Identifying
such win-win solutions is often quite difficult. Intuitively, such solutions might be easier to
identify if the parties pool their resources rather than try separately to identify a solution that the
other members would accept. Due to information impactedness (Williamson, 1975), some
problems seem to require a coordinated effort to get a solution.
Strategic Groups
Strategic groups represent a view of collectives with a greater emphasis on economic
issues. As noted in the discussion of cognitive communities, managers of firms observe rival
firms to gain information about what works in the environment (Porac, Thomas, and Baden-
Fuller, 1989). In other words, managers, acting like brokers, learn about the socio-political
constraints associated with various subnetworks by observing successful agreements among other
collectives (e.g., rivals and consumers). If a rival firm positions itself in an extraordinarily
profitable niche, some of its competitors will be tempted to follow it (Scherer, 1980; Tirole, 1988).
As a result of this process, firms are expected to converge on the strategic positions that yield the
highest levels of performance. 3
As new firms enter a niche, demand is divided among more competitors. Hence incumbent
firms experience a decline in their respective market shares, and subsequent entrants tend to gain
smaller portions of the market (Scherer, 1980; Tirole, 1988). "This process should continue until
the opportunities for making a supranormal profit have been exhausted" (Scherer, 1980). Mobility
barriers (Caves and Porter, 1977; Fiegenbaum and Thomas, 1987; Tirole, 1988; Caves and
3 For the sake of readability and coherency throughout the paper as a whole, it will be assumed that firms have not
diversified and that they function as single business units. The logic can be extended to diversified firms by
substituting "strategic business umts (SBUs)" for "firms". Multiple point competition among conglomerates
would be more complex, but quite appropriate given the systems approach to overlapping networks proposed in this
text
8Ghemawat, 1989) and uncertain instability (Lippman and Rumelt,1982) lower the economic
incentives for potential entrants and help to preserve economic incentives for incumbents.
Firms seek the most profitable niches that they can successfully defend. The firms with the
best fit to environmental demands get the lion's share of the profits. The weaker firms (i.e., those
ill-fitted to the environment) are left to scramble for footholds in the less attractive niches. This
process tends to bunch firms together in a number of profitable niches. These naturally occurring
bundles of firms have been labeled strategic groups (Porter, 1980; McGee and Thomas, 1986).
A weak definition of strategic groups could be based on similarity of asset configurations
either as a means of operationalizing firms within similar niches or firms with similar resources
(McGee and Thomas, 1986). Explicit in the structure-conduct-performance paradigm of
I-O economics is that firms in the same niche will follow the same strategy because they are
influenced by the same external forces. That is, firms within a group would be expected to react
the same way to events in their environment. This I-O economics view focuses on the
environmental forces outside of the firm.
A resource-based view of the firm (Penrose, 1959) is more inward-looking and adopts a
focus on economics at the firm level. In a resource-based view, strategic groups are clusters of
firms with similar resources and core competences, and it is assumed that firms with similar
strengths and weaknesses are likely to act in similar ways. While the focus of the I-O economics
approach differs from that of the resource-based view, the implications are the same. Firms within
strategic groups are expected to behave in similar ways. This is assumed to be true even if each
firm is acting independently: collusion is not necessary for firms to act in parallel.
Implicit in the term "strategic group" is that the firms in a given group are pursuing a
common strategy. That is, the managers direct the decision-making processes and the subsequent
actions of the firm based on similar goals and beliefs about how to obtain those goals. Adopting a
cognitive/decision-making orientation, a semi-strong definition of strategic groups adds a
constraint to the weak definition by also requiring sets of firms to be similar in terms of goals and
beliefs (i.e., similar cognitive structures). This added requirement would avoid grouping firms
that have acquired similar resources but for different reasons.
A strong definition of strategic groups adds one more constraint to the semi-strong
definition. In addition to (a) similarity with regard to resources and (b) similarity with regard to
goals and beliefs, the strong definition also requires (c) interdependence and interaction among
firms within a group. This additional criteria counters the criticism that strategic groups are merely
statistically defined, artificially imposed categories. To be considered a strategic group, a set of
firms would have to operate as an interacting, ongoing collective.
Firms sharing a common niche may have conflicts with respect to inputs (e.g., transactions
with suppliers), throughputs (e.g., labor, equipment), and/or outputs (e.g., distribution channels,
direct transactions with consumers). The actions of Firm-A could affect the profitability of
Firm-B, and vice versa. Multipoint, cut-throat competition would tend to reduce profits of all the
firms in the niche, while cooperative (collusive) behavior would allow firms to take greater profits
(with monopoly rents as an upper bound) (Scherer, 1980). This interdependence can be viewed as
a mixed motive game in that there are, simultaneously, incentives to cooperate and compete with
rival firms. Typically, a mixture of cooperation and competition evolves. However, as
interdependence becomes more defused (e.g., firms can not effectively punish specific rivals), the
degree of competition will tend to increase. Porter ( 1980) suggests that this type of
interdependence among firms is the essence of oligopoly.
Cooperation may be relatively passive. For instance, firms may simply agree not to
compete on a particular strategic dimension such as price or quantity of output. This is the notion
of tacit collusion in oligopoly theory . A more active form of cooperation might involve collective
strategies involving coordinated, joint actions. Cooperation may be aimed at achieving a common
goal. For example, pharmaceutical firms could potentially join efforts toward finding effective
treatments for AIDS. Alternatively, actions could be directed toward rival firms outside of the
group. For example, erecting mobility barriers for the group could reflect collective efforts in a
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defensive posture. Collective advertising designed to increase the joint market share of the group
relative to the rest of the industry would illustrate a more offensive stance.
While firms within the group may have to compromise with other members of the group
when forming a collective strategy, the process may broaden their options overall. By
supplementing and/or complementing each others assets, a collective may compete in ways that
none of its member firms could (Penrose, 1959). This may include attempts to manipulate (enact)
industry structure.
From a strategic management point of view, this joint action is perhaps the most intriguing
aspect of strategic-groups. The weak and semi-strong definitions of strategic groups suggest that
firms within groups will have parallel reactions to environmental change. This helps to simplify
industry analyses for strategic planning purposes (Porter, 1980). In contrast, the strong definition
of strategic groups as networks of interacting firms enriches industry analyses by considering more
sophisticated forms of strategic behavior such as collective strategy (Astley, 1984; Bresser and
Harl, 1986; Nielsen, 1988; Fombrun and Zajac, 1987). It is unfortunate that such networks of
interactions are generally ignored when operationalizing the strategic-group construct.
Networks of Interactions Within and Among Firms
The third theoretical perspective on collectives of firms within industries is adopted from
organizational behavior and organizational theory. Firms are relatively formal systems of
interacting individuals. They represent hierarchical nexuses of relatively long-term contracts
(Hsenhardt, 1985). Given that firms are embedded in larger systems such as industries, the
hierarchical nesting can be extended beyond the boundaries of firms (Jemison, 1981; Frombrun,
1986). In addition to being hierarchically nested, these networks of individuals may be partially
overlapping within and across levels of the hierarchy. For example, individuals may interact
within networks constituting (a) firms, (b) professional interest groups, (c) unions, (d) families,
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etc. These networks may overlap any number of times and the nature of relationships between any
two individuals may be extremely complex. 4
Each individual belongs to an idiosyncratic set of networks, and therefore, may be viewed
as an agent who answers to an idiosyncratic set of principals. Each individual has a personal
agenda that stems from the contingencies imposed by the relevant principals.
The concept of a firm represents a cognitive (and legal) simplification that facilitates
perceptions of actors and actions (March and Simon, 1958). While it is often expedient to talk
about a "firm's response" to events in its environment, focusing on the firm may oversimplify
certain problems (Penrose, 1959). Consider March and Simon's ( 1958) argument that a price
mechanism and profit maximization goals for the separate parts of a production process could be
used to predict firm behavior. These predictions should parallel those made when examining the
firm as a whole. That is, macro-level maximization follows (more or less) from micro-level
maximization if the criterion used at the micro level are appropriate. This is the notion of the
invisible hand. Under these conditions it is not necessary to analyze the component parts of the
firm; the solution set obtained by decomposing the firm into individuals and that obtained by
considering the firm as a whole are isomorphic.
However, if (a) the profit maximizing goal is replaced with a satisficing goal and
(b) pricing mechanisms are based on imperfect factor markets, it is not certain that the behavior of
individuals and coalitions will result in optimal patterns of behavior for the firm or for social
welfare. The invisible hand could waiver. Therefore, to predict the interactions among firms, it
may be necessary to consider each firm as a network of individuals and examine the intersections
of those networks.
Networks within firms. Williamson ( 1975) proposes that individuals cooperate to form
peer groups or hierarchies in order to mitigate the impact of bounded rationality and to reduce their
transactions costs. More generally, individuals enter into groups and organizations to obtain
"*This is the concept of "multiplexity" in network analysis.
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personal benefits that they could not readily obtain on their own (Penrose, 1959; March & Simon,
1958; Axelrod, 1984).
Networks may emerge and evolve without formal planning or design. Participants may be
muddling through without consensually held ideals or common goals. On the other hand,
networks could be developed intentionally. To enact a vision of a market, an entrepreneur could
identify potential participants and convince a sufficient number of them that the interactions would
be profitable with an acceptable level of risk. In addition to economic incentives, there may be a
broad range of reasons for interacting within a network (e.g., personal interests, charitable/ethical
considerations, image). A shrewd entrepreneur will often emphasize the idiosyncratic set of non-
economic incentives that are salient for a given participant and use these as bargaining chips to
reduce the level of economic incentives necessary to induce participation.
This suggests that routines (and the complex social systems they are embedded in) can vary
in cost. The most efficient routines are self-reinforcing and, therefore, self-perpetuating. To
sustain less efficient routines, the firm might have to pump in resources to reward past participation
and maintain satisfactory expectations regarding payoffs for future participation.
According to March and Simon (1958), the survival of the firm depends on how much it
costs to run the routines relative to the price that the consumer is willing to pay for the product or
service. If the price is at least as great as the cost, then the participants can receive the expected
level of rents. The routines will continue to fire as expected until the perceptions of the payoffs
change.
If the expected utility of performing a part of the routine drops below aspiration levels,
and/or a superior alternative is perceived (Thibaut & Kelley, 1959), some participants might
withhold or redirect some or all of the resources they would otherwise contribute to the routine.
This shirking may reduce the efficiency and effectiveness of the routine. Consequently, co-
workers who depend on that routine may receive personal rents below their aspirations.
To pressure the shirking member to cooperate, co-workers might exploit patterns of
resource dependence in a variety of the partially overlapping networks that linking them to the
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shirking individual. Alternatively, if there are no incentives for co-workers to coerce shirking
members and if co-workers perceive that their pay-offs will be the same whether they personally
work hard or shirk, then the co-workers might also decide to shirk. A degenerative chain reaction
of this nature could spread throughout the network resulting in a marked drop in performance for
the routine as a whole. Consequently, the network in which the routine is embedded may receive
lower payoffs as a whole, thereby reducing the allocations to the participants. If payoffs to
participants drops below satisfactory levels and superior alternatives are present, some individuals
may be motivated to leave (Hirschman, 1970; Thibaut and Kelley, 1959). Eventually, the routine
and the network in which it is embedded may fail or, more descriptively, dissolve.
While predictions based on individual-level and firm-level analyses my differ under certain
conditions, the processes involved at each level may be quite similar. March and Simon ( 1958,
p. 131) state,
Many of the phenomena of intergroup conflict within organizations are
almost indistinguishable from the phenomena that we might consider under the
present heading [interorganizational conflict]. The distinction between internal and
external relations for an organization is frequently a cloudy one.
In a similar vain, Hennart (1991) argues that the distinction between firms and markets is a
matter of relative emphasis. Firms emphasize behavioral controls; markets emphasize price
controls. There are few pure forms. By far, the majority of institutions have a mix of behavioral
and price controls. By considering both forms of control it should be possible to move smoothly
from predictions within firms to those between firms.
Networks between firms. Managers may be viewed as brokers who set up and manage
macro-level routines embedded in macro-level networks. 5 Agency problems are clearly an issue:
managers may select and manage routines and networks based on anticipated personal rents
(Levinthal, 1988; Eisenhardt, 1989). Managers may not be motivated to optimize the rents for
5The term "macro-level" is used in a relative sense. It merely suggests that routines and networks may be
decomposed into smaller routines and networks. As such, the discussion may apply to intra-firm and/or inter-firm
issues.
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networks at either the micro-level or the macro-level. That is, by pursuing personal agendas,
managers may not act in the best interest of either their firms or the market as a whole.
As managers negotiate and renegotiate the terms of interactions, subsets of managers
(acting as brokers among firms) reach equilibrium points such that the terms of interactions will not
change significantly as a result of further interactions and/or renegotiations. If the equilibrium
reached in a given network is not satisfying for all of the participants (i.e., firms represented by
managers), some participants may withdraw from that network and seek transactions in another
network (Hirschman, 1970; Thibaut and Kelley, 1959). The withdrawal of these participants may
cause gaps in the value chains. If these gaps can not be filled, the entire network may dissolve.
Eventually some networks that are satisfying for all of its participants will form. Actors
within these networks will tend to stay within the network. Further, participants may work to
preserve the network (e.g., offer additional economic incentives to retain critical members),
thereby preserving their own source of rents. While an equilibrium may exist within the network,
disequilibrium may exist between networks and within the larger embedding network as a whole
(e.g., an industry, a value chain). Therefore, the term bounded equilibrium will be used to
describe the stable state of such networks. It is assumed that managers satisfice. Hence, once a
satisfactory state is obtained, there will be little motivation for managers (acting as brokers) to
search for alternative transactions.
Stable networks are functional in that they can enable collectives (e.g., strategic groups,
cognitive communities) to achieve goals that could not be achieved by the participants separately.
Yet there may be an optimal level of robustness in such bounded equilibria beyond which the
network becomes insensitive to environmental signals for change. The slow response of the US
automotive industry to pronounced changes in its environment illustrates how an overly robust
bounded equilibrium may be bad for business.
The view of business as multiplex patterns of exchange within fluid, hierarchical collectives
is consistent with phenomena such as joint ventures, equity sharing, mergers, etc. (Pfeffer and
Nowak, 1976; Harrigan, 1988; Lyles, 1988). This network approach can be extended to address
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phenomena among even larger networks. Individuals acting as brokers may create and manage
cartels to limit competition or fix prices. OPEC exemplifies the power that such alliances can
generate. The North American Free Trade Agreement and the European Economic Community
illustrate this process extending simultaneously beyond the boundaries of industries and nations.
The key point is that the imposition of formal boundaries at any level of analysis typically does not
limit the entrepreneurial ingenuity of brokers (representing networks of any size) who believe it
would be profitable to span those boundaries. Therefore, it may be helpful to adopt theoretical
perspectives which are not unduly constrained by such boundaries.
Theoretical Overlap Among the Types of Collectives
A Venn diagram illustrates the overlap in the definitions of cognitive communities, strategic
groups, and networks of interdependent firms (See Figure 1). The three criteria used in
definitions are (a) interdependence and interaction, (b) similarity of cognitive structures (goals and
beliefs associated with attaining those goals), and (c) similarity of assets.
Insert Figure 1 about here.
The definition of networks is the easiest to diagram at this point, as there is only one
version of it and only one criterion-interactions among interdependent actors (e.g., managers,
firms). Sets of interdependent, interacting firms would fall into sections A, C, D, or G in
Figure 1. While a time dimension is not included, it may be useful to add a time based constraint
for research purposes to avoid the noise of transient relationships. That is, analyses could be
confined to networks that obtain a reasonably robust bounded equilibrium. Of course, what
constitutes "reasonably robust" is inherently a judgement call, and should be determined by the
specific needs of the study.
For cognitive communities, two definitions have been proposed. The weak definition only
requires the managers (acting as brokers for the firms) to have similar cognitive structures. Sets of
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firms that satisfy this definition would fall in section A, B, D, or E. In addition to having similar
beliefs and goals, the strong definition requires that the members of a cognitive community
interact. This emphasizes the social aspect of social cognition research. The intersection of the
two criteria covers sets of firms in sections A and D.
For strategic groups, the weak definition merely requires similar asset configurations
(sections A, B, C, and F). The semi-strong definition of strategic groups adds the constraint of
similarity of goals and beliefs (cognitive structures). Due to this additional constraint, only sets of
firms falling in sections A or B would be considered strategic groups. The strong definition of
strategic groups stipulates that all three criteria must be satisfied: (a) similar assets, (b) similar
goals and beliefs, and (c) interdependence and interaction. Only sets of firms in section A would
fit that definition.
Note that the degree of overlap among these constructs is highest when using the strong
definitions and lowest when using the weak definitions. For instance, the set of firms fitting the
strong definition of a strategic group would be a subset of those fitting the strong definition of a
cognitive community. When the weak definitions are used there would ba a larger proportion of
strategic groups that would not be considered cognitive communities, and vice versa.
There are at least two meaningful ways to use the definitions of these constructs.
Researchers could select a definition (weak, semi-strong, or strong) that is appropriate for a given
research question, and then use that definition to select a sample of firms for a study.
Alternatively, researchers could start with a particular sample of firms (e.g., the US automobile
industry), and then determine which level of each definition is satisfied in that sample.
Regardless of whether researchers select the definitions first and the sample second or vice
versa, it is crucial that the definitions used when developing hypotheses are identical to those used
when operationalizing the constructs. It is likely that hypotheses generated using strong definitions
will not be supported if the measures used to operational ize the constructs only satisfy the weak
definitions. Similarly, hypotheses based on strong definitions probably will not be supported if a
preselected sample only satisfy the weak definitions (regardless of the measures used).
17
The lack of correspondence between operationalizations and theoretical constructs alludes
to the introduction of bias when interpreting patterns of data and translating empirical findings to
successively higher levels of abstraction. The impetus behind the efficiency-effectiveness heuristic
proposed for synthesizing related bodies of knowledge is this dubious correspondence between
information at different levels of abstraction. Certainly, the introduction of such bias is
unavoidable. However, when conflicts at high levels of abstraction appear to be unresolvable, a
reexamination of empirical findings (i.e. what is actually measured) may suggest a way forward.
Empirical Studies Linking the Theoretical Constructs
In the preceding section, it is argued that cognitive communities, strategic groups, and
networks of interacting firms are related constructs. However, at this point, they are related by
definition only. While the strong definitions of cognitive communities and strategic groups are
more eclectic than the weak definitions, it is not clear a priori how the three criteria used to
operationalize the constructs will interact. What factors influence the degree of
convergence/divergence of criteria? The degree of convergence/divergence has implications for the
evolution of collectives within industries. Findings from a series of empirical studies are used to
go beyond the initial theoretical integration and flesh out an understanding of the formation and
nature of collectives of firms within industries.
Thomas, Porac, and colleagues have conducted a series of studies of collectives in a variety
of industries. These include a highly turbulent emergent industry (the computer software
industry), a mature industry that is undergoing very gradual changes (the retail grocery industry),
and a mature industry that has been extremely stable over time (the Scottish knitwear industry).
The three industries provide an ordered set for study. The software industry marks one extreme as
it is continuously changing. The knitwear industry marks the opposite extreme as it has changed
very little over the years. The grocery retail falls somewhere between those extremes.
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US Software Industry
The software industry was selected to examine the nature of cognitive communities under
conditions of extreme ambiguity. There are a large number of partially overlapping, yet diverse
niches. Hence, it is unclear which economic forces are most critical for a given firm. Further,
rapid technological change creates considerable ambiguity regarding changes over time.
In a study of twenty software-development start-ups, cognitive orientations and pervasive
social networking were found to be critical in the start-up process (Levenhagen and Thomas,
1990). Due to the continuous changes in this industry, there is little chance of any particular
perspective being repeated often enough to be established and spread as a shared industry recipe.
"Entrepreneurs in those markets seem intent on creating rules to new competitive games by
intuitively trying to create new product categories, new kinds of firms, and growth markets"
(Thomas and Porac, 1991). The only shared beliefs reflected (a) the awareness of ambiguity and
(b) the belief that the ambiguity creates opportunities.
Levenhagen's (1992) more recent research examines the degree of consensus throughout
the value chain with respect to desirable product characteristics. Findings in networks of suppliers
and buyers are consistent with previous findings across rivals: namely, there is little consensus on
what the ideal software package in a particular niche should be like.
UK Grocery Retail Industry
The grocery retail industry is much more stable than the software industry. In a pilot study
used to assess similarities and differences in views, six to ten managers were interviewed from
each of three organizations representing a range of supermarket retail operations. Results revealed
that cognitive taxonomies of rivals varied widely from firm to firm. Further, differences were
found across managers within the firms. It was suggested that the taxonomies were richer in areas
that the given manager was most familiar with. This familiarity effect was evidenced by more
taxonomic levels, more categories at any given level, and richer lists of attributes associated with
each category.
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When managers make sense of a market, the resulting cognitive structures reflect the
elements that the manager encounters most often and is most familiar with. While this certainly
reflects a cognitive bias, the underlying cognitive heuristic seems relatively pragmatic. 6 Cognitive
structures are developed to fit the manager's personal needs in terms of decision-making and
problem solving.
Two subsequent studies have been performed to compare a cognitive approach with a more
conventional approach to industry and competitor analysis (e.g., Porter, 1980; McGee and
Thomas, 1986). In the economics oriented study, Lewis and Thomas (1990) and Carroll, Lewis,
and Thomas (1992) identified strategic groups in the industry and the competitive recipes that
defined the groups. Annual data reflecting scale and scope dimensions of strategic choice were
obtained from the largest 16 multiples (chains) over a seven year period.
In the cognition oriented study, questionnaires were administered to a large number of
managers within two retail operations: a large multiple (chain) and a large coop.7 Questionnaires
assessed each manager's views about career issues, who they viewed as competitors, the attributes
of those competitors, and the competitive structure of the industry.
The results from the cognitive data were similar to those from the economic analyses with
respect to the key strategic dimensions. Multi-dimensional scaling of the cognitive data indicated
that there were three key dimensions in this industry: store size, geographic coverage, and
price/proportion of own-label lines. These dimensions reflect the economies of scale and scope
noted in the economic analysis of the industry.
In addition to identifying key strategic dimensions, the results of the multi-dimensional
scaling procedure were used to plot the firms in the cognitive representation of the strategic space.
This plot was compared to the strategic groups identified using a cluster analysis on the economics
6Presumably, an unbiased structuring would reflect the industry in its entirety with uniform richness throughout, but
this assumes that industries are clearly bounded. This is arguably not the case as most industries are better described
as fuzzy sets than as discrete units (Porter, 1980).
7The identity of these firms are withheld to honor guarantees of confidentiality.
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oriented data set. While the groupings from the two methods were not identical, many of the firms
were consistently grouped together.
Scottish Knitwear Industry
A third set of studies was conducted on the Scottish knitwear industry which exemplifies
stability. "This particular group of firms was thought to be an ideal case for studying the influence
of shared beliefs and competitive recipes given its small size, cultural homogeneity, geographical
characteristics, and long-standing traditions" (Thomas and Porac, 1991).
A pilot study (Porac, Thomas, and Baden-Fuller, 1989) with top managers from
approximately 20 firms replicated findings from the grocery retail study. The richness of
taxonomies reflected a given manager's demands for cognitive processing, and the set of
competitors consisted of firms in the same taxonomic level as the manager's firm. Notably, these
managers only listed other Scottish firms as their rivals; Italian producers were perceived as being
in different businesses.
In a larger study, questionnaires were sent to 260 firms; 89 usable questionnaires were
returned. A cluster analysis was performed on an array strategic variables reflecting each firm's
choices regarding raw materials, production methods, distribution channels, and end consumer.
Thus, the resulting strategic groups were based on inputs, throughputs, and outputs.
If firms are geographically close together and have similar inputs, throughputs, and
outputs, then the firms will probably compete for suppliers, workers, equipment, buyers, etc.
Network analysis revealed that the densities of both cooperative and competitive ties were higher
within the groups than between them. That is, firms are more likely to be perceived as rivals
and/or allies if they are in the same economically based strategic group than if the are in different
groups. The differences in the density of interactions within groups versus between groups were
very consistent in this sample. Network analysis (PARTEST in the UCINET package) was used
to compare the patterns of competition and cooperation within and between strategic group. For all
89 firm (100% of the sample), the average cooperation/competition with firms in the same group
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was greater than or equal to the average cooperation/competition with all other firms. Hence,
based on this criteria, the network analysis of cooperation and competition was able to predict
which strategic group each firm belonged to with perfect accuracy.
In comparing lists of rivals and allies provided by the managers, it was found that the sets
were not mutually exclusive. In fact, the overlap was fairly strong (r = +.32). This suggests that
cooperative and competitive interactions are not diametrically opposed. These actions may be
better thought of as tools in a repertoire of behaviors that firms use to manage economic
interdependence (e.g., to discipline mavericks within an oligopoly).
To determine if the members of each group had a shared sense of identity, each manager
was asked to rate a number of terms to indicate which terms best describe his firm. A MANOVA
was performed using strategic group membership as the independent variable and descriptiveness
ratings as the dependent variables. The significant results indicated that there was greater variance
between strategic groups than within them in terms of how managers label their firms. Scheffe
tests suggested that these differences followed fairly simple patterns reflecting relatively discrete
categories. This suggests that the members of these strategic groups have some consensus on the
type of firms they are.
Findings suggest that managers do perceive distinct groups of interdependent, interacting
firms in the Scottish knitwear industry. Different groups use slight variations on a common recipe.
Still, an industry recipe seems to exist within the greater cognitive community (Scottish knitwear
producers). The strategic groups are part of the same superordinate category (i.e., Scottish
knitwear) while other producers (e.g., Benetton) fall into other categories (e.g., Italian knitwear) at
that superordinate level.
As noted earlier in this section, the similarity in this shared set of beliefs at the strategic
group level, and to a lesser extent at the industry level, is probably due to the small size, cultural
homogeneity, geographical characteristics, and long-standing traditions. The remarkable stability
in this industry may be due to the fact that it has been virtually a closed system. There have been
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vary few avenues through which novel ideas could enter, and the bounded equilibrium in that
segment of the value chain has been robust and highly resistant to change.
Interpretation of Empirical Findings
The empirical findings reveal a convergence of the cognitive, organizational, and economic
criteria in the two stable industries (grocery retail and knitwear). Given that the criteria were
operationalized using different methods and different types of data, it is unlikely that the collectives
identified by these criteria are simply statistical artifacts. This lends support for the construct
validity of these forms of collectives (Cook and Campbell, 1979).
It would be inappropriate to conclude that this degree of convergence across methods
negates the need for pluralistic research. The degree of convergence among these theoretical
perspectives is not as high in every situation as it was in the Scottish knitwear industry. Studies in
turbulent industries such as computer software development suggest that perceptions, industry
structure, and patterns of interactions may show very little overlap. It is conceivable that the
measure of cognitive similarity was a poor operationalization for the construct. However, this
explanation does not seem plausible given that the method replicated that used in a number of
studies in the other two industries.
A more plausible explanation is that the relationships among the economic, psychological,
organizational factors may be moderated by some other factors). For example, the degree of
ambiguity in an industry could influence the accuracy of managerial perceptions. In ambiguous,
rapidly changing environments, the initial (mis)perceptions of managers drive subsequent social
enactment processes. In the absence of industry-wide consensus, many socially constructed
networks have little systematic impact on the structure of the industry while a select few may cause
Schumpeterian revolutions. In such revolutions, the economic reality would come in line with the
perceptions of members of the innovating cognitive community (i.e., those enacting their shared
vision). Consequently, there would be close agreement between economic, cognitive, and
organizational measures within that particular cognitive community. For the rest of the industry,
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however, there would be increased discrepancies between perceptions and economic realities.
Generally, it will take some time for the victims of the Schumpeterian shock to recognize the
change and interpret it, let alone respond to it. Hence, time may be a key strategic dimension, and
dynamic modelling may be necessary to understand the nature of competition in turbulent,
ambiguous environments. Psychological, organizational, and economic factors may be traced over
time, and the interaction of these factors may significantly improve predictions of industry
dynamics.
Figure 2 sketches the loose coupling of insights from psychological, organizational, and
economic streams of research. A cycle of reciprocal causation is proposed in this theoretical
framework. Economic factors (industry structure) influence psychological factors (the perceptions
of economic incentives). Related cognitive processes within individuals drive organizational
processes among individuals (group decision-making within top management teams) which drive
organizational processes among buyers, suppliers, and rivals (the social enactment of markets).
The causal chain comes full circle as this social enactment process influences economic factors
(industry structure). Some slippage may be induced in these causal links due to uncertainty and
ambiguity arising from (a) imperfect information regarding the economic forces currently
operating in a particular niche, and (b) an inability to forecast the the future structure of the
industry due to the threat of technological or regulatory changes. 8
Insert Figure 2 about here.
There appears to be a growing population of managers confronted by a world that is rapidly
changing. These are the practitioners that are perhaps in greatest need of (most receptive to)
guidance from business scholars. Notably, it is unlikely that any single perspective would
°It is reasonable to assume that there may be variables other than ambiguity that mediate or moderate the interactions
among psychological, organizational, and economic factors. It would be prudent to continue this stream of research
in a wider range of industries and across a wider range of phenomena to develop a richer understanding of these
interactions.
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sufficiently explain critical events under these circumstances, and the bits of unique information
generated by the perspectives may be very difficult to integrate. The key to putting the pieces of
the puzzle together may involve the interaction effects among variables that have traditionally been
considered separately by the various disciplines.
In the absence of relatively holistic theories it may be difficult to explain why economically
irrational patterns evolve and persist. For instance, it appears that the Scottish knitwear industry as
a whole is threatened by the Italian knitwear industry just as the US automotive industry was
threatened by the Japanese producers (Thomas and Porac, 1991). However, the cognitive
taxonomies of the managers in the Scottish knitwear suggest that those managers do not view the
Italians as direct competitors.
There seems to be a consensus in the industry that strategies that have worked in the past
will continue to work in the future. These beliefs seem to persist despite the recent formation of
cooperative alliances and the adoption of collective strategies among Italian producers. Until the
economic threat is perceived by managers (psychological factors), it is unlikely that the Scottish
managers, acting as brokers for their firms, will systematically modifying their existing patterns of
interactions with suppliers, designers, distributors, etc. (organizational factors) in order to expand
into other geographic and product markets, erect entry barriers, etc. (economic factors).
If Italian collectives can capture a significant portion of the market share from the Scottish
firms (i.e., break into existing networks of transactions with buyers), then rents within the Scottish
knitwear industry may drop below satisfactory levels. This would motivate managers to identify
the problem (gap analysis) and change the way they approach transactions. This may bring about
an end to the bounded equilibrium that has existed in the Scottish knitwear industry and give rise to
dramatic changes in the nature of competition.
In addition to predicting responses to change in (traditionally) stable industries, holistic
theories may shed some light on industry dynamics in continuously turbulent industries such as the
US computer software industry. As technology based competition becomes more prevalent, the
need for more comprehensive theories becomes harder to ignore. It would seem that contemporary
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issues in strategic management demand more holistic perspectives than are currently offered by
more narrowly defined fields, and strategic management research provides the most obvious forum
for a renaissance in theory development.
A Heuristic Approach to Holistic Theory Development
As a field, strategic management is inherently interdisciplinary in that the phenomena of
interest transcend the boundaries of previously existing fields of research. Strategic management
lies at the nexus of a diverse set of fields: cognitive and social psychology, organizational
behavior, organizational theory, and industrial organizational economics, to name a few. The
accumulated bodies of knowledge associated with these fields are quite large. As such, it may be
more efficient in general to use information at higher levels of abstraction (e.g., theories) in the
integration process. Unfortunately, differences along two dimensions (the unit of analysis and the
nature of the phenomena) seem to motivate the use of different, often conflicting, sets of theoretical
assumptions. The intersection of logical propositions (i.e., common ground) in these fields
rapidly shrinks as more perspectives are simultaneously considered. This makes it difficult to
integrate these fields using deductive logic on the intersection of theoretical premises.
This reflects the trade-off between efficiency and effectiveness when operating on
accumulated bodies of knowledge at various levels of abstraction (discussed in the introduction
section of this paper). A reasonable heuristic for managing this trade-off is to use high level
abstractions when ever possible, and move toward more concrete levels (empirical findings) when
conflicts at more abstract levels can not be resolved. Inductive logic may be used to develop new
(more holistic) theories based on existing bodies of empirical findings and new empirical findings
focussing on the interaction of factors associated with the different fields.
An inescapable flaw of inductive logic is that it may introduce new sources of bias. With
this in mind, a high level abstraction is needed to guide the synthesis process, thereby minimizing
the risk of internal inconsistencies (i.e., contradictions among biases). Given the scope of the
problem, a parsimonious structure seems advisable. A reasonable structure for the union of the
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fields would be to use the two dimensions that emerge when juxtaposing the fields: the level of
analysis and the nature of the phenomena studied. The levels of analysis that will be considered
are relatively straightforward: individuals, dyads of individuals, collectives of individuals (e.g.,
firms), dyads of firms, and collectives of firms. The nature of phenomena (knowledge-,
affiliation-, and resource-related) is described using a taxonomy inspired by Foa and Foa's (1975)
circumplex of currencies of social exchange and French and Raven's ( 1959) sources of power.
French and Raven (1959) proposed six types of power sources: informational, expert,
reward, coercive, referent, and legitimate. Foa and Foa (1975) developed a circumplex
categorizing the currencies of social exchange: love, status, information, money, goods, and
services. These taxonomies are merged and collapsed into three broad currencies of exchange and
sources of power: knowledge, affiliations, and resources. Knowledge-related phenomena are
associated with French and Raven's informational power and expert power, as well as the Foa and
Foa dimension of information. Affiliation-related phenomena are associated with French and
Raven's concept of referent power and Foa and Foa's dimensions of love and status. The
resource-related phenomena are associated with a catch-all category that subsumes legitimate,
coercive, and reward power from the French and Raven model and money, goods, and services
from the Foa and Foa circumplex. These two dimensions (the unit of analysis and the nature of the
phenomena) provide a parsimonious structure for organizing the knowledge accumulated in fields
related to strategic management.
The scope of the framework is ambitious, yet it is not without precedent. Indeed, many of
the overarching ideas have been circulating for over three decades. March and Simon's ( 1958)
behavioral view of the firm addresses the knowledge- and affiliation-related aspects with some
mention of resource-related issues. Penrose's (1959) resource-based view of the firm focuses on
the interplay between resource- and affiliation-related aspects with some mention of knowledge-
related issues. Williamson's (1975) transaction cost theory places the heaviest emphasis on
affiliation-related issues while addressing some knowledge- and resource-related issues. While
these three theoretical frameworks differ in their relative emphasis on types of phenomena, they all
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take a bottom-up approach by starting with assumptions about small units of analysis (individuals,
resources, transactions) and deriving implications for larger units (firms, industries, value chains).
On a continuum ranging from basic-research to applied-research, March and Simon's and
Penrose's frameworks seem to lean toward basic research while Williamson's framework has
more of an applied flavor to it. Figure 3 illustrates a bottom-up approach and the placement of
some relevant issues within the proposed two dimensional framework.
Porter's ( 1980) approach to competitive strategy frames the debate in a top-down fashion
with a much stronger emphasis on applied-research. Porter focuses on generating likely scenarios
for industry dynamics. With this goal in mind, he argues that economically rational strategies
should be based on the anticipated actions of other firms. Hence, strategists should consider the
political processes within each firm and even the cognitive and emotional processes of each
decision maker in the firms. Figure 4 illustrates some of the primary concerns of the top-down
approach.
Insert Figures 3 and 4 about here.
Figure 4 is a macro (collective) representation of the micro (dyadic) relationships among
firms illustrated in Figure 3. Moving between Figures 3 and 4 is analogous to moving closer to or
further from a painting by Van Gogh. The perceptions of the painting may change as one's
attention is drawn to either the short line segments or the larger images formed by those brush
strokes. The perspective alters the perception, but the painting remains the same. In research,
moving from one unit of analysis to another may change the patterns that are noticed in a body of
data, but it does not change the underlying phenomena. Dyadic interactions among firms flow
together to form cognitive communities, strategic groups, even value chains. Concepts from
network analysis are being used to span these units of analysis and examine these macro level
patterns.
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The framework proposed in this paper has been greatly influenced by both the bottom-up
and top-down approaches of the existing broad-scope theoretical frameworks. The proposed two-
dimensional framework reflects an attempt to dove-tail the "push" of basic research and the "pull"
of applied research. So, while the two dimensional framework offer a novel way of structuring
information, it is important to note that the overarching ideas were proposed a long time ago by
some of the giants of theory development. There is no attempt to take the credit for inventing the
wheel. The proposed framework merely attempts to put axles between existing wheels to develop
vehicles for future research.
The two dimensional framework also facilitates the inclusion of more recent theoretical
developments. The framework acts as a peg-board that can be used to tack on narrower theories
that address more specific issues. For example, sophisticated models of social cognition (e.g.,
Wyer and Srull, 1989) may be used to augment the understanding of how mangers perceive their
environment and manipulate relevant information. Finance models may be used to enhance the
valuation of currently held resources, the discounted value of (potential) future outcomes, the value
of maintaining various options, and so on. Implications from resource dependence (Pfeffer and
Salancik, 1978) may enhance the understanding of power relationships among firms. This peg-
board approach reduces the risk of overlooking relevant information as the synthesis process
pushes for a deeper understanding within each area of the framework.
As noted earlier in this section, Figures 3 and 4 serve as blueprints for theory construction.
They help maintain a holistic mind-set and minimize the risk of internal inconsistencies within the
framework. This is reminiscent of a slogan used by some activists: "Think globally, act locally."
The intuition behind synthesizing information is analogous to that used when sewing a
quilt. Keeping the overall design in mind makes it easier to see how the sections need to be pieced
together. This helps to avoid wasting efforts on nonessential connections. If large pieces dove-tail
together, the process can move along quickly. If partially overlapping pieces can not be neatly
combined, each piece may be unravelled, and the threads may be woven into a new piece designed
to cover the area. It is not necessary to directly link every possible permutation of edges together
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as long as the network of connections provides an overall coherence (i.e., no internal
inconsistencies).
In initial attempts at theory development it is assumed that the environment is unambiguous
and information flows relatively freely. This simplifying assumption makes it easier to extrapolate
interactions among types of phenomena from one level of analysis to another. To make models
applicable to more real world situations, the assumption may be relaxed, and the effects of
ambiguity are tracked through the framework.
Developing Analytic Models within the Theoretical Framework
After developing a viable blueprint, the push for greater depth of understanding is
important if this synthesis of knowledge from related fields is to be of much use to practitioners.
Frameworks of this scope are often useful for framing research questions, but often they are too
abstract or vague to generate specific predictions or recommendations.
Current research includes efforts to develop a mathematical model and an artificial
intelligence model (Carroll, 1991). Both of these models are designed to predict interactions
among firms (industry dynamics). While being drawn toward economically rational patterns, the
models attempt to simulate distortions due to cognitive biases and emotional reactions and to
predispose individuals to various forms of political activities within the firm (e.g., coalition
formation, political infighting). This takes a game-theoretic approach to modeling industry
dynamics given (a) the initial distributions of individuals' beliefs and power and (b) the structure of
the networks connecting those individuals. A nice feature of these models is that the input may be
based on theoretical assumptions or empirical data (e.g., responses to questionnaires, archival
data).
Relative to natural languages, analytical models provide a more precise means of
expressing ideas. A primary goal of developing these analytic models is to identify implicit
assumptions that may be overlooked in the theoretical framework. Unlike theorists, computers
don't make implicit assumptions. Assumptions must be explicitly stated in the program, or the
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models will not function as expected. This offers an invaluable method of tightening up a set of
logical arguments.
Further, due to the complexity and scope of the theoretical framework, it is likely that the
limits of human cognition will be exceeded when tracing implications through the framework.
These analytic models are being developed as tools for pushing a set of assumptions to their logical
conclusion. As such, these analytical models may be better thought of as a means (rather than
ends) of critical thinking (Jasany, 1989; Thomas, 1988, 1990; Carroll, Pandian, and Thomas,
forthcoming).
From a practitioner's perspective, models developed from this proposed framework may be
useful in predicting when and how a firm's actions will deviate from economic rationality. If the
models can predict such deviations, they could improve the accuracy of competitor response
profiles. These, in turn, could improve the accuracy of the scenario analyses and the effectiveness
of strategy formulation based on those scenarios. Ultimately, this could mean improved
performance for the firm.
Conclusion
Relative to managers in stable industries, managers immersed in ambiguous environments
may perceive a greater need for insights from strategic management research. Ironically, while this
ambiguity may create demand for theories, it also creates the conditions under which the theoretical
perspectives currently used in strategic management provide the least comprehensive and most
divergent sets of results. If interactions among psychological, organizational, and economic forces
are overlooked, it may be impossible to integrate the divergent findings. Consequently, general
managers may be hard pressed to develop a comprehensive strategy based on reports submitted
from a variety of departments by analysts trained in different areas.
This does not imply that the theories and methods within a specific field are incapable of
answering the questions relevant to that field. Nor does it imply that the questions asked in
narrower fields are of no interest in strategic management. The point that is strongly implied is that
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the need for holistic theory development falls squarely in the domain of strategic management, and
solutions can not be borrowed from narrower fields.
Strategic management has traditionally emphasized applied research and borrowed theories
from a variety of fields that have emphasized basic research. The relationship between strategy and
economics has been compared to the relationship between engineering and physics. While
practitioners may benefit from such an orientation, there is very little value added for researchers if
a multilectic approach merely applies several perspectives without building on the insights gained
from juxtaposing them. This may do a serious disservice to the field by ignoring the opportunity
for interdisciplinary theory development.
Perhaps another metaphor could be found that would suggest the potential value added by
strategic management research. I-O economics could be likened to Newtonian physics in that it
studies certain forces impinging on an object (e.g., an organization, and industry). Organizational
behavior and organizational theory could be likened to chemical engineering in that they focus on
the properties of the objects or the medium being acted upon (e.g., an organization, an industry),
and they often endeavor to redesign or create novel forms with more desirable properties. Strategic
management could be likened to fluid dynamics: the medium and the forces acting upon/within it
are inherently intertwined and cannot be meaningfully separated. This reflects the inseparability of
the content and process sides of strategic management (e.g., formulation and implementation).
So, while economic incentives may be the best single predictor of business transactions,
people negotiate the deals and make the decisions. While conduct within a market may be drawn
toward economic rationality, cognitive and social forces may produce friction inhibiting the
movement toward economically rational patterns. These forces may even drive the patterns in
economically irrational directions. Metaphorically, an organization or institution (e.g., an industry)
is like a viscous medium that generally flows in a predictable direction (i.e., toward economic
rationality), but due to the nature of the medium, it is predisposed to the formation of eddies and
backwashes which temporarily impede and even reverse this flow in some niches.
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While boundary spanning fields such as fluid dynamics and strategic management build on
empirical findings and theoretical developments in narrower fields, the research questions asked in
boundary spanning fields can not be completely addressed using the theoretical frameworks from
any one of the narrower fields taken in isolation. More holistic frameworks are needed to address
the phenomena of interest within boundary spanning fields.
When viewing strategic management phenomena (e.g., collectives of firms within
industries) from more than one perspective, the perspectives often offer some common
(overlapping) insights and some unique insights. These perspectives can be combined "additively"
by considering them one-at-a-time. This would be analogous to facing out over a garden and
alternating between looking with one's left eye and then one's right eye (monocular vision). By
combining one-eyed perspectives, it is possible to see a wider range of the garden. However, by
looking through both eyes simultaneously (binocular vision) the interaction of the perspectives
generates cues for depth perception that are otherwise missing.
A holistic approach to strategic management offers more than just a wider view of a given
phenomenon. It creates opportunities to see new dimensions. This is illustrated by the
serendipitous observation that ambiguity may play a moderating role in the evolution of collectives
within industries. Hence, a meaningful goal for this stream of research would be to work toward a
relatively holistic theoretical framework that subsumes existing theories by addressing the union of
the phenomena studied (Feyerabend, 1970). Insights from philosophy of science suggest that
such a journey may be a worthwhile even if the ultimate destination is far away and perhaps
unreachable.
The development of holistic frameworks could nurture a renaissance in strategic
management in that a rebirth of theoretical developments may arise from the marriage of
accumulated knowledge from diverse fields. As more comprehensive theories are developed, it is
likely that the methods associated with narrower theories will have to be modified to provide
adequate tests of broader hypotheses. Such theoretical and methodological development might be
described as the emergence of a new paradigm in a relatively young field (strategic management),
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rather than a paradigm shift in any of the older, more focused fields (Kuhn, 1962). A renaissance
in theory development may be fueled by an accumulation of new questions, rather than an
accumulation of aberrant findings associated with existing paradigms. As the nature of research
questions in these fields diverge, so to will the evolutionary paths of their paradigms.
It is important to recognize that discussions of paradigm shifts are implicitly discussions of
social enactment processes within an academic community. The suggestion that there may be other
ways of doing things often raises red flags with established researchers who have made, and
continue to make, invaluable contributions to the field. In no way does this paper suggest that
holistic theory development is the only way to advance the field. There appear to be a number of
viable "strategic groups" of researchers in this field. This paper is intended to highlight the
potential rents to be gained from interdisciplinary theory development and suggest that the field as a
whole may benefit from the existence of a "strategic group" that focuses on the research needs that
are unique to strategic management.
Empirical findings suggest that different theoretical perspectives provide a greater amount
of non-redundant information as the degree of ambiguity increases. The rapid changes coursing
through the business world have generated a great deal of ambiguity for managers. These
(presumably) temporary conditions suggests an acute need for an academic renaissance. The
emergence of high tech fields characterized by continuously technological change suggests that
there may be a chronic need for such theories. In other words, there is a pronounced short term
demand and a projected long term demand for holistic theories. Academicians should be sensitive
to this market pull for theory development even if it seems at odds with traditional views of
strategic management.
In a traditionally practitioner-oriented field such as strategic management, development of
integrative theories could provide a more holistic view of firms and industries. More to the point,
it could improve techniques for forecasting industry dynamics, thereby improving the effectiveness
of practitioners in developing competitive strategies. Ironically, the field's contribution to
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practitioners would be unnecessarily constrained by fostering the belief that strategic management
should focus on applying theories, rather than developing them.
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Figure 1. Venn Diagram Reflecting Overlapping Sets of Firms that Would be Encompassed
by Using Various Combinations of Criteria
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Figure 2. Cyclical Patterns of Causal Links Between Various Cognitive, Organizational, and
Economic Factors.
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